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NÜ001A-69-A-0200-1055 Most: frac· ti~nal-flow manpower pl.ann~ mode ls assu.e tbac the "transition frac tions" are ' e ither fixed or can be manipulated at wi l l . As neithe r of these assumptions is very realistic , we pre sent a model in which the transition fractions are conceived of as being the product of the c omplex interaction of three sets of economic agents ; t he organization, its competito rs in the ma npowe r market, and its e mployees . Subseque ntly , t he sensitivity of the model is e xplor ed a nd possible extensions of it are conside r ed . Finally, a smal l numerical example i s gi ven t o i l lus trate the model's practical applicability.
INTRODUCTION
Fractional flow (or Markov) models a r e f r eque ntly c ited as useful t oo l s in the analysis of manpower planning problems. Rowland a nd Sove r eign [14] have proposed the Markov model to study the interna l manpowe r s upply of fi r ms, wh ile Eaton [7] has proposed Markov chain analysis to study ma ss l ayoff problems , espe cially those caused by layoffs at major airc r a ft ma nufac ture r s . Uya r [1 7 ] has used the Markov model to study manpower replacement needs of the New England
Telepho ne Company. Vroom and MacCri mrnon [18] have applied the M arkov mode l t o t he manpower planning problems of a "large industrial firm." Bla kely [4] a nd Niels e n and Young [12] have explained the Markov model i n eleme nta ry t e rms , \.rhile ~la r sh a ll
[ 11] has compared the ~farkov model and the so-called cohor t mode l i n a pr e c is the oretical manner. Oliver [13] has used the Markov model t o p redict s t ude nt ( lows a t the University o f Ca l ifornia , Berke l e y, \vh i l e Ga ni [ 8] has used i.t t o study t he Aus tralian educa tiona! sys t ern, Clough and [15], Toole [16] ) that ha ve bee n concerned wj t h the contro l of a g raded ma npm,re r system whos e dy~am i cs is app ropria t ely d esc r i bed by t ht• Harke v mode I. !\one o f these studies , howeve r, r e la tes the t r a ns i t inn f r act i ons t o pol i cy o r Pxte rn RI marke t vari a bles \vhi ch i s of pa rtic uLar inte rt: Sl i n the s t ud y o f f irms r•r of th e armed services . One ef f ec t o f th is omiss j o n has been noLcd bv 13 . 1r l hu l o me lv 11 1.
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, |B||Bf!S!BIPBS!!j3i!SPj!^^ "The basic Markov model described in this chapter and the various extensions outlined above all have an important defect-at least when applied to the flows of manpower in a firm. They all assume that individual behavior is unaffected by iiow individuals perceive their environment and, in particular, tiieir promotion chances.
It seems plausible to suppose that an individual's assessment of his promotion chances will affect the likelihood of his leaving.
If this is so, our model ought to include a statistical relationship (probably lagged) between wastage rates and promotion rates." This paper will examine the transition fractions in a hierarchical manpower model and propose a simple economic decision model that can be used to determine the manpower transition fractions as a function of labor market conditions, and the wage and promotion policies of the organization. The basic assumption of the fractional flow model is that during any time period a constant fraction of the people in any given rank will move to any other given rank. This also implies that a constant fraction of the people in a given rank will leave the organization.
Therefore, we let:
I I
J-J P.. = the fraction of people in rank i at the beginning of any time period that move to rank j before the beginning of the next time period, for i = 1, ..., n ; j = 0, ..., n , where j = 0 denotes moves to outside of the organization and where P.. -■ 0 , and
The model is then defined by the following system of equations:
To simplify the analysis, one often considers the steady-state version of the above model. Recall that under the steady-state assumption the values of the model variables are not permitted to change over time. Tills implies that we may simplify the system of Equations (2.1) to:
We will make two further simplifying aasumptiüiis. First, we do not allow demotions which means that: . ■ simple, which allows it to also be operational, but it is detailed enough to capture the flavor of the real world situation it: is designed to describe. 
I
Recalling that the assumptions we made in Section 2 (and which were to be carried over to the present analysis) allow for promotions of one rank only, we let q.. 
.) . ij i+l j i+l
We illustrate the conceptual framework for an exampl' with M = 1 . The probability tree for this process is shown in Figure 1 . Here the round nodes indicate chance events and the square nodes indicate decisions by individuals.
In an operational sense the W.'s in these relations represent the average discounted lifetime earnings of people in rank i who have accepted offer j in the past. 'Ine V.'s , the "values" of the various ranks, could similarly be obtained from historical records, but to obtain them in this manner would be decidedly contrary to our purposes here. After all, our interest here is precisely in how an organization can affect the values of its own transition fractions.
Surely, one of its most effective tools for doing this is its ability to affect the value of its own positions. Fortunately, the framework already developed allows us to write a simple recursive relation which can be used to evaluate the V.'s . 
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In view of the unbounded horizon form of this recursion, we would do well to interpret the V.'s as the expected value of the given position over time rather 11 s.
than its expected value to any one individual. Upon rearrangement, (3.1) becomes:
For i = n , since people in the highest rank cannot be promoted, q . = 0 and (3.2) simplifies to: •^^qriyvrrr, ^^r^w^TTTf^* f J ' Pfl^^PWWW mmmntnmmm. verifying the signs of those sensitivity derivatives whose signs are intuitively obvious to us, our faith in the model is reinforced. Second, the calculation ot those sensitivity derivat es whose signs are not obvious to us gives operational predictions for actual applications of the model. We obtain not only the expected sign of the change in the model prediction due to a change in a particular model parameter, but also the local magnitude ol such a change.
In other words, we can ascertain not only which policy tools will move our manpower system in a desired direction but also which of these policy tools will be most effective in doing so.
Although sensitivity derivatives have been calculated lor the model in its most
general form where n ranks and M possible offers are considered, the results tend to be quite complex and nearly impossible to conjecture about on intuitive grounds. Consequently, we will present the sensitivity derivatives for a simplified system in which people in each rank can obtain only a single distinct offer.
Consideration ol this simplified system allows us to demonstrate some basic underlying relationships inherent in the model, without undue computational complexity.
Letting W. be the only offer availabU to people in rank i , we may summarize the modi'I described above in terms ol the relations (J.5), (i.l) and (i. summarized in Table 1 . We demonstrate our method by giving analytical expressions for several of these partial derivatives.
-HI.. does nave a second order effect ol increasing the value of the original rank i .
Under tills additional assumption about 11,. , we can show that, as we would expect, Notice that we have implicitly assumed here that people don't take into account the fact that they might die in calculating their future income streams.
To handle the fact that people may retire from the organization, we can let r. be the fraction of people in rank i who retire per year so that M ) R.. = 1 -r. and we let A. be the present value ot the annuitv a person who retires from rank i receives. If we further lot I'.. be the fraction of people .
whore W corresponds, here, to the expected present value a person who either o leaves without an offer or is fired can expect to obtain. This extended model, while more complex notationally, is almost as easy to analyze as the model analyzed in this paper.
One might still object to the lack ol inclusion of the equilibrium age distribution of the organizational members as a predictor of the retirement and dying fractions. It would not be theoretically difficull to adjust the arguments in earlier sections to the case where the rank i implicitly contains some information about the individual's age. We could consider a rank space where an individual moves from (i,t) to (i , t + 1) or (1+1,1+1).
A further extension would be tu include people's attitude towards risk in the model by including the variances of the expected discounted income streams as arguments of the "leave" functions. ranks and two different cases were considered. The first case will be presented, the modifications necessary for the second case will then be given and finally the two cases will be compared.
In the first case, the following data was used (for easy reference a short definition of each variable is given): 0)
The transition fractions for this case turned out to be: Comparing the results tor the two ciises, we see that for Case 11 about b% more of the people in the organization leave the organization from rank '3 and that slightly more people leave from ranks J and 2. Comparing (6.4) and (6.7), we see that the simple act of cutting off promotions from rank 3 to rank 4 drastically modifies the configuration of the organization for rank 3 and above. To illustrate this point more graphically, we calculated the appointment vector, (f.) , for
Case II that would make the equilibrium distribution for Case II identical to that for Case I. This appointment vector was: So that (comparing (6.8) with (6.3)) we see that to compensate for less promotions from rank 3 to rank 4, fewer people need to be hired into rank 3 even though more people leave the organization from that rank, which is a not altogether intuitive result. This is because the reduction in people promoted from rank 3 more than compensates for the increase in people who leave the organization from that rank. It is also necessary to hire more people into rank 4 as we might have expected.
This simple example was not designed to demonstrate the entire range of applicability of the model, but rather to give the reader a feel for how the model might profitably be used in practical applications. 
